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REPLY
WHAT'S IN A NAME? INCOME,
CONSUMPTION, AND THE SOURCES OF TAX
COMPLEXITY
DAVID F. BRADFORD"
Professor Paul has provided a nuanced analysis of complexity in
the tax law.' She may well be right about the tangles that would
emerge, should the country seek to travel the consumption tax route.
I fear, however, that her treatment of problems that could arise under
a variety of circumstances may distract from the potential for
simplification offered by the consumption-and not by the income-
approach to tax design. After reading her Article, I remain
convinced that the consumption approach wins the simplicity contest.
Professor Paul identifies three sources of complexity: the quest
for equity, the financial stakes in reducing uncertainty, and interest
group politics.2 My basic position is that, unless one defines equity in
terms of Haig-Simons income, consumption tax approaches are
superior on all three counts. To be sure, any system can be made
complex (in all three dimensions that Professor Paul identifies). In
our political process, complexity is a likely outcome in any regulatory
regime (need I mention pensions, financial institutions,
environmental regulation?). The consumption tax approach does not
promise nirvana. But I think that once the approach is understood, it
is possible and even likely that simplicity relative to current law
would result.
In my view, the theoretical contrast between consumption and
income as guiding ideas for a tax base has diverted attention from
how actual taxing schemes that fit under one or the other rubric
* Professor of Economics and Public Policy, Princeton University, and Adjunct
Professor of Law, New York University. Ph.D., Stanford University; M.Sc., Harvard
University; B.A., Amherst College.
1. See Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can
Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151 (1997).
2. See id at 163-80.
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might actually work. Take as an example a value-added tax of the
consumption type implemented by the subtraction method? In such
a system, each business is taxed on the difference between gross sales
and purchases from other businesses. If all businesses are taxed at
the same rate, interbusiness transactions net out, so the tax base in
the aggregate equals the sales by the consolidated business sector to
households. This is a measure of national consumption-one reason
for applying the term "consumption type" to this tax. A well-known
feature of such a tax is that purchases of capital goods from other
businesses are immediately deducted (that is, expensed) by the
acquiring business. Changing the accounting for such purchases to an
income basis-substituting depreciation allowances for expensing-
converts a consumption tax into an income tax. It seems to me that
this is not a very dramatic difference.
One reason why this is made out to be a dramatic difference is
that economists have taught us that under an income tax, "capital
income" is fully taxed, whereas under the consumption tax, it is
completely free of tax. Exempting income from capital would seem,
surely, to be a regressive approach. Yet if we study the actual
systems I described, we see that the difference is that the taxpaying
business gets an acceleration of a certain deduction. The great
fortunes are not made on early versus late deductions. They are
made by inventing Microsoft DOS or monopolizing the cigarette
industry. These sources of great wealth are taxed alike under either
the consumption-type or the income-type value added tax. The
labels, "consumption" and "capital income" (the rest being,
presumably, "labor income"), divert commentators from looking at
what actually is occurring. The valid point is that in principle, the
difference between income and consumption taxes is the treatment of
the risk-free reward to waiting.4 Whether or not one agrees with me
3. See id. at 185.
4. I say "in principle" because in practice, income taxes are such bad
approximations of the ideal. Consider, for example, the taxation of risk-free interest with
even very modest inflation. Professor Paul notes that the federal income tax (along with
the state income taxes) does tax inflationary gains. See id. at 191 & nn.146-47. The
inflation problem is much more problematic than is suggested by Professor Paul's
discussion. The federal tax also allows deduction of the inflation premium in interest
paid. As a result, in a time of inflation, the inconsistency between the treatment of
different forms of financial returns is likely to permit sufficiently clever taxpayers to
arbitrage away their "capital income." For example, they can borrow to buy assets that
appreciate. It is true that the appreciation is overtaxed (because of failure to correct the
basis for inflation) but the interest deduction may be so exaggerated that it
overcompensates. Inflation is a killer of an income tax that does not use mark-to-market
accounting.
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that the timing of consumption should not affect a person's
discounted tax burden, this treatment does not amount to much.'
There are, to be sure, consumption type systems that would
markedly change the distribution of the tax burdens. Replacing the
income tax with a proportional sales tax, with no adjustment in
transfers or programs such as the earned income tax credit, would be
just such a major change. But the same comment would apply if the
replacement were an income-type value-added tax.
I agree with Professor Paul that the equity issue drives the
debate. As we both see it, the equity challenge to all tax systems is to
attach the right burdens to the right people. I have generally argued
that the right people to bear relatively more of the tax burden are
those who are fortunately endowed with skills and opportunities.
Identifying those people is very difficult, but it also is my view that
income and consumption taxes discriminate among people in about
the same way in the most important dimensions. Where they differ,
in differently discriminating among people who differ in their taste
for the timing of consumption or the timing of their endowed
earnings, it seems to me the income tax is inferior.'
Professor Paul gives a good example of the failure of a
consumption tax to discriminate correctly between two people who
have the same opportunities when she notes that "a person who has
the opportunity to earn $100 but chooses not to earn the $100 has the
ability to pay tax on $100 (because she has the ability to earn the
$100), but she does not have any consumption because she does not
in fact earn the $100 and consume it."7 It is unclear why Professor
Paul does not emphasize that consumption and income-type taxes are
equally deficient on this score because the hypothetical person also
would have no income. To me, this is the central defect of both
income and consumption taxes but hardly a particular shortcoming of
5. This point is slowly being absorbed into the conventional wisdom. See Joseph
Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption
Tax a Debate About Risk? Does It Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377, 407 (1992); David F.
Bradford, Consumption Taxes: Some Fundamental Transition Issues, in FRONTIERS OF
TAx REFORM 123, 128 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996); William M. Gentry & R. Glenn
Hubbard, Distributional Implications of Introducing a Broad-Based Consumption Tax, in
11 TAx POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1, 1-2 (1997).
6. As Professor Kaplow has pointed out, the discrimination under a conventional
Haig-Simons income tax between two individuals, alike in the discounted value but
differing in the timing of their earnings, is due to the failure to account consistently for
human and other capital. See Louis Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax,
80 VA. L. REv. 1477, 1490-94 (1994).
7. Paul, supra note 1, at 194.
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consumption taxes relative to income taxes, the bone of contention
here.
In my view, if one asks not whether consumption taxes will
produce greater simplicity than income taxes, but instead whether the
consumption approach offers significant advantages if one is setting
out to design a fair and simpler system, however one may choose to
label it, the answer remains, "yes."
The distractions in this quest are, by and large, of two types.
One set of distractions relates to adjustments that are often made
within proportional taxes to make them more progressive. For
example, Professor Paul notes that a "common approach in the case
of a retail sales tax or a value added tax is to exclude necessities, such
as food and prescription drugs, from the tax base."' It is hard to
understand why this admittedly common source of complexity is
necessary in the first place in a system that permits, through transfers,
a wide variety of superior methods of vertical adjustment.9 As a
replacement for the existing income tax, an indirect income tax would
suffer from the same shortcomings and attract the same sorts of
remedies.
As pointed out by Professor Paul,'° two consumption type
reforms are capable of satisfying the not-much-change-in-overall-
progressivity requirement: a direct tax (epitomized by the Cash Flow
Tax proposal spelled out in Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform1 ), and a
proportional indirect consumption tax (such as a value-added tax)
accompanied by a major change in the transfer programs, such as
expansion of the earned income credit. In the latter category, I put
the Flat Tax or the (more progressive) variant that I have dubbed the
8. ld. at 195.
9. Professor Paul applies the positive-sounding adjective "flexible" to the option to
impose different taxes on different goods under retail sales and credit-and-invoice value-
added taxes. See iL at 186. Note that this flexibility, which may have something to do
with the political success of these forms of tax, is arguably undesirable on all the criteria
usually accepted by policy analysts. It is ineffective as a means of adjusting for equity,
and utterly unnecessary when there is a personal tax and transfer system. It is a huge
source of complexity and compliance costs. It is wonderful for playing interest group
games. Least certainly, but probably, it is a source of extra deadweight loss relative to a
uniform rate. (Whether this is so depends on a lot of cross-elasticities about which we
have virtually no evidence.)
10. See id. at 181.
11. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM
(1977). This source is also available, in convenient format, with index and with a preface
by me containing commentary that benefits from hindsight, as DAVID F. BRADFORD ET
AL., BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (2d ed. 1984). For further discussion of the
cash flow tax, see generally DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAx 75-
99,316-20 (1986) [hereinafter BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX].
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"X Tax." 2 Either of these approaches would permit progressivity
similar to that of the present system. Whether they would satisfy
other criteria, including other equity criteria is, to be sure, debatable.
But they should indicate the direction in which to look when
encountering progressivity concerns while pursuing the consumption
approach. 3
The second set of distractions relates to various measurement
problems that might arise under a consumption approach that
satisfies the requirement of progressivity. Examples in Professor
Paul's Article include the treatment of owner-occupied housing and
consumer durables, 4  measurement of consumer surplus and
nonmarket consumption, including leisure,' distinctions based on the
timing of cash flows, 6 distinctions between real and financial
transactions, 7 distinctions between domestic and foreign location of
consumption,8  and distinctions between services (including
education) and goods. 9
12. The "X tax" scheme is in the class of "two-tiered cash-flow taxes" described in
BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX, supra note 11, at 59-74,329-34.
13. A brief comment, cutting across the income-consumption issue, on simplicity
aspects of the choice between the indirect-with-adjustment and the direct approaches: as
Professor Paul notes, in this choice there are forces working in both directions. See Paul,
supra note 1, at 181-87. There exists a striking example, however, of the potential for
simplicity and low compliance costs in a system with sufficiently clear conceptual
underpinning: the social security payroll tax. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 302-433 (1994). It is
interesting that an instrument second in revenue only to the individual income tax, with a
rate of over 15%, seems so relatively free of complexity and low in compliance cost.
14. See Paul, supra note 1, at 199.
15. See i at 200.
16. See id. at 202.
17. See id at 205-06.
18. See id. at 206-07. In a personal consumption (or income) tax framework, the
distinction would never arise. In an indirect tax framework, the matter is a little subtler.
Ignoring for the moment cross-border shopping (tourism), enforcement problems, and
transition, the two approaches (origin versus destination principles) have to be essentially
equivalent, since trade surpluses equal trade deficits in discounted value. Aside from
appearances, which are important politically, the border adjustment question, as I see it,
involves transition and a trade-off between two contending administrative approaches.
First, with no adjustment (sales to abroad are taxed, purchases from abroad are
deducted), there is no need to police the border, but transfer pricing problems are a
nightmare. Second, with adjustment, there is no transfer pricing problem, but you have to
check at the border, and goods purchased abroad as a tourist escape U.S. tax. The latter
problems are diminished if tax regimes and rates are similar in different countries.
In a true individual Haig-Simons income tax, the situation would be comparable to
the Blueprints Cash Flow Tax. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 11, at 9.
If an entity-level tax (e.g., value-added tax or corporation income tax) is employed, I do
not think that one can seriously argue that the treatment of international transactions is
not much easier under a consumption tax than under an income tax.
19. See Paul, supra note 1, at 207-08.
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I believe that for these, and for most of the other examples
raised in the Article, there are relatively simple responses. Rather
than take them up seriatim, I would emphasize two general points to
keep in mind while thinking about such issues. First, if, as is
generally accepted, an income tax is supposed to be based on the sum
of a person's consumption and change in wealth during a period, any
question about how to interpret the consumption concept should be
about the same in both systems. So, for example, an ideal income tax
would measure the yield obtained from an owner-occupied home, in
the form of consumption services and accruing wealth. An ideal
consumption tax would measure only the consumption piece."
Second, and more important, the object of the game is not to
measure and tax consumption, or income, for that matter. The object
is to impose tax burdens on the right people-to achieve equity-in a
simple manner. That is why I usually speak of consumption
approaches or the consumption approach rather than consumption
taxes. Thus, if one accepts as a good outcome the result of treating
owner-occupied housing services as consumption and taxing them
currently, a system that-while not measuring and taxing such
consumption currently-nevertheless imposed the same burden,
understood as the same discounted tax liability, is fine.21
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that my equity argument is
accepted and that substance, rather than form, is to guide our design
of instruments. (So, for example, we are not put off if someone who
receives a payment of interest does not at that point send a check to
the Treasury, provided we are convinced that person bears an
appropriate share of the tax burden.) Since it is conceded that many
20. It is ironic that Professor Paul singles out as a potential source of complexity in a
consumption tax the need to measure the consumption element of owner-occupied
housing, and the similar consumption yield of other consumer durables. See id. at 199.
Whereas exactly the same problem exists in an income tax but is insoluble, one of the nice
things about consumption approaches is that they get this right, in the sense of consistency
with the treatment of other assets. This (especially owner-occupied housing) is generally
taken as one of the major advantages of the consumption over the income approach. For
an extensive discussion of this point, see, for example, BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE
INCOME TAX, supra note 11, at 85-86.
21. This is the effect of a value-added tax applied to the purchase of housing, and of
the disallowance of adeduction for purchase of a house in the Blueprints Cash Flow Tax.
Similarly, in the Blueprints Cash Flow Tax, the taxpayer is allowed to choose between
qualified account and tax pre-payment treatments of financial assets and liabilities. See
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 11, at 18, 121-22. The choice affects the
timing of tax payments but not their discounted value. If the tax rate varies over time,
this present value equivalence breaks down, but Blueprints argued that the self-averaging
effect of allowing the taxpayer to choose between treatments was one of the strengths of
the proposed system. See id. at 123-24.
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sources of complexity are the same in the income and consumption
approaches (such as dealing with the family and the business-
personal boundary), what are the relative advantages of the
consumption approach?
I believe that the main advantages arise from (1) the possibility
of virtually eliminating the taxation of financial transactions from the
personal tax and greatly simplifying their treatment in the business
tax; and (2) making feasible the correction of the tax base for
inflation. Although these may seem to be minor, technical matters,
consider just three examples of matters in which these advantages
arise: new financial instruments, retirement savings, and capital
gains.
New financial instruments. The U.S. economy is extraordinarily
dynamic. Innovation and flexibility are its hallmarks. Nowhere has
innovation proceeded more rapidly than in financial markets. The
ingenuity of Wall Street's rocket scientists is legendary. The tax
system relates to these developments in two ways. First, much of the
ingenuity is directed toward obtaining the best tax results in
connection with any particular economic activity. Indeed, some of
the ingenuity is directed to making profit at the expense of the U.S.
Treasury. The tax rules also obstruct the accomplishment of new
financial arrangements.2
Retirement savings. The second example is retirement savings.'
22. David Hariton provides a superb illustration of the problems, taking as an
illustration of the state of the law the steps involved in advising a taxpayer who owns low-
basis stock and borrows identical stock and sells it short. See David P. Hariton, The Tax
Treatment of Hedged Positions in Stock-- What Hath Technical Analysis Wrought?, 50 TAX
L. REV. 803, 804-09 (1995). This would seem to be a pretty straightforward, if not exactly
everyday transaction. Having first established that any number of possible complicating
characteristics of the taxpayer do not apply (the taxpayer is not a controlled foreign
corporation, for example), Hariton goes on for many pages discussing options that the tax
advisor must resolve, rules that may or may not apply, apparent inconsistencies, and so
on, and concludes there is no unambiguously correct advice. See id.
23. When I started as an assistant professor at Princeton University a long time ago,
there was a retirement plan that called for contributions that were graded according to
age, one rate up to age 30, another to age 40, and the highest rate over age 50. At some
point Princeton changed its plan, but let existing faculty elect to continue on the "old
plan." The new plan was more generous than the old plan up to age 50, and less generous
after age 50. I chose to stay on the old plan. By the time I reached age 50, most faculty
members were on the new plan. Those of us who had survived so long at the University
were, perforce, in the senior and hence better-paid ranks of the faculty. At that point it
was determined that the old plan discriminated in favor of better-paid employees, and
was therefore ineligible for favorable tax treatment. We had to switch to the new plan,
notwithstanding the fact that we had just reached the point where our persistence in the
old plan was about to pay off! Believe it or not, my objective here is not to plead for
relief from this injustice, but simply to call attention to one of the most complex areas of
1997]
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Practitioners know how difficult it is to assure compliance with the
law, and how much talent is devoted to designing plans that fit within
the regulatory constraints. Yet the contractual relations between
employer and employees serve a large variety of economic functions.
As with financial innovation, we are, on the one hand, wasting
resources figuring out how to make the arrangements that most
exploit the tax advantages, while staying within the law, and on the
other hand, tying the hands of our employers and employees in
reaching the most effective compensation arrangements.
Capital gains. It used to be said that half of the business of a tax
accountant or lawyer was converting ordinary income to capital
gains. The other half was converting capital losses to ordinary
income losses. This was especially true when the difference in the
rate of tax applied to the two types of income was larger than it has
been until recently. But the difference has widened again. And in
any case, because of the necessity to limit capital losses, the rules that
distinguish the income according to its ordinary or capital gain
"character" have continued in force and account for many inches of
tax law books. In view of the interminable controversy about capital
gains taxation, it need hardly be said that the rules involve much
more than fees for accountants and lawyers, but enter into many
aspects of the business and financial life of the country, with costly
effect.
All three of these examples have in common that they are
sources of great complexity and impose costs on the U.S. economy.
These costs are borne not only by the businesses and individuals who
must directly comply with the rules in question. Like the costs of
banking laws or securities laws or telecommunications regulations,
the costs that they impose are spread throughout the economy,
striking workers and consumers at all income levels. These three
examples also have in common that they are hard to fix within an
income approach, given the lack of acceptance and impracticality of
universal mark-to-market accounting.
A third common element shared by these three examples is that
they are easily dealt with in a consumption tax approach.
Not just any old consumption tax will translate into a simpler (or
otherwise better) tax law. An il-informed application of the ideas
can lead to something like the European value-added taxes or the
state sales taxes.24 These may be simpler than the U.S. income tax,
the tax law.
24. Cf. Paul, supra note 1, at 195 nn.163-64 (comparing complexity under a U.S.
consumption tax to complexity under European sales taxes); id at 195 n.165 (comparing
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but they are hardly encouraging models for us to follow. On the
other hand, a consumption approach to tax design grounded in a
clear grasp of the underlying logic does, indeed, hold the potential for
a much simpler law. Professor Paul has added to our knowledge of
the complexity-producing processes. As far as the consumption-
income base choice is concerned, I hope that readers will take away
from her account a catalogue of traps for the unwary rather than a
conclusion that the consumption approach cannot be deployed to
advantage in the quest for a simpler tax system.
complexity under a U.S. consumption tax to complexity under state sales tax regimes); iU
at 206-07 (describing difficulties that state sales tax regimes encounter regarding taxation
of goods purchased outside but consumed within the state); id. at 207-08 (suggesting that
the difficulties that states have experienced with teasing apart goods and services also
would be problematic for a federal consumption tax).
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